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Abstract
We introduce attention games. Alternatives ranked by quality (producers, politi-
cians, sexual partners...) desire to be chosen and compete for the imperfect atten-
tion of a chooser by investing in their own salience. We prove that if alternatives
can control the attention they get, then ”the showiest is the best”: the equilibrium
ordering of salience (weakly) reproduces the quality ranking and the best alter-
native is the one that gets picked most often. This result also holds under more
general conditions. However, if those conditions fail, then even the worst alterna-
tive can be picked most often.
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1 Introduction
Choice requires attention, and attention may be imperfect. We study the situation in
which alternatives compete to be chosen and can select their own salience, namely their
effectiveness in being noticed by an imperfectly attentive chooser. Our analysis focuses
on general phenomena. The lessons we derive abstract as much as possible from the
specific nature of the alternatives, be they producers, politicians, sexual partners, and
so on.
When the chooser’s attention is imperfect, the most popular choices are not neces-
sarily the best. They may be alternatives that have invested in salience more than their
better competitors: they are ‘all show and no substance’. Indeed, as we explain later,
an inferior alternative may have more incentives than a better one to invest in salience.
We explore this issue using (Nash) equilibrium analysis. We show how the technology
of salience and attention impacts on the nature of the observed equilibrium and the re-
lationship between quality and salience. We study in particular in what circumstances
strategic forces act as a substitute for a chooser’s cognitive ability.
We use the concept of a consideration set, which originated in marketing science
(Wright and Barbour [17]) and has recently become popular in economic models (e.g.
Eliaz and Spiegler [5], [6]; Masatlioglu, Nakajima and Ozbay [11]; Manzini and Mari-
otti [10]) as a tool to model agents with an imperfect ability or willingness to consider
all objects of choice that are physically available.1 In these models, an agent’s choices
from a menu are guided by a preference relation, but preference is only maximised on
the subset of alternatives in the menu that the agent actively considers, or pays atten-
tion to. There is evidence of situations in which the consideration set is strictly smaller
than the menu. For example, Goeree [7] documents that purchasers of personal com-
puters are typically not aware of all available models when making a choice. 2
That alternatives can influence the consideration set of the chooser is natural in
1See also Roberts and Lattin [14] and Shocker et al. [15].
2The failure to seriously consider all alternatives may in fact stem from several sources (it may for
example be the outcome of a search process, or of ideological prejudice - see e.g. Wilson [16]). We focus
for simplicity on the attention interpretation.
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disparate contexts. Aminor politician canmake an outrageous statement to get noticed
by the media and thus enter the voters’ consideration set, but he will likely incur a cost
in terms of credibility. A single person in search of partners can increase expenditure
on hairdressing to get noticed. He may or may not like hairdressing: both situations
will be captured in our model. Brand awareness can be increased by increasing the
advertising budget. This last example illustrates an important case of our model. If
the aim of an advertising campaign is merely to generate awareness of the products
(rather than to influence tastes) then it is natural to assume that awareness of one brand
is largely unaffected by the advertising campaigns for, and the awareness of, other
brands. The evidence in van Nierop et al. [12] indeed suggests that the probability of
being noticed is independent across alternatives.
Assume that while salience is endogenous, the quality of an alternative (its position
in the preference ranking of the chooser) is fixed. Competition for attention between
alternatives gives rise to an interesting strategic situation, which we call an attention
game. Attention games turn out to have a nice hierarchical structure that ensures the
existence of Nash equilibria in pure strategies in any finite game in several subclasses
(Propositions 1, 2, 3, 4).
We aim to answer the following questions about equilibria of attention games.
Suppose that we ignore the effect of technological asymmetries in the production of
salience. Then:
 Is there a systematic relationship between quality and salience, and if so, which
alternatives choose to be more salient?
 Are alternatives of higher quality chosen more often than those of low quality?
The answer is (Proposition 5) that, in the absence of other asymmetries beside qual-
ity, if alternatives can fully control the attention they get (though obviously not the
probability with which they are chosen), then the showiest is the best: it can never
happen that an alternative a is strictly more salient in equilibrium than an alternative
that is better than a. And therefore, because whenever two alternatives are both no-
ticed the inferior one cannot be chosen (recall that the chooser maximises within the
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consideration set), alternatives of higher quality are chosen more often that those of
lower quality. The showiest is also the most chosen.
This result is especially interesting in light of some recent laboratory evidence sug-
gesting that, when strategic aspects are absent, there is a lack of correlation between
alternatives’ quality and the probability of being noticed (Reutskaya et al. [13], Kra-
jbich and Rangel [8]). In our previous work [10] on individual decision making we
also made no assumption of correlation between quality and visibility. Our current re-
sult indicates that when strategic factors do operate, they might induce a sharp depar-
ture from this baseline. This is particularly relevant in a context such as supermarket
choice, which is the environment that Reutskaya et al. [13] replicate experimentally.
This study supports the hypothesis of our model that consumers optimise within the
consideration set (called there the “seen set"). However it also shows that consumers
appear to search randomly with respect to product quality. High quality products are
not more likely to be noticed. Because in real supermarkets producers invest heavily
to increase the salience of their products, it is hard to assume that strategic forces do
not operate, and thus our model suggests the possibility that the lack of correlation
observed in the experiment might not continue to hold in the market. But in turn, this
assertion depends how robust the the-showiest-is-the best result is, an issue which we
now discuss.
In some respects the result holds under quite general conditions. For example,
it is not even necessary to assume that increasing salience requires costly effort: if
generating salience were a costless or even a rewarding activity, the result would go
through. The conclusion can also be generalised to a larger class of games that satisfy
a weak supermodularity condition on the technology of salience (Proposition 3), and
for which in addition alternatives cannot damage the visibility of other alternatives by
increasing own salience. These conditions can be roughly summarised by asserting
that the spillovers from competitors’ salience are not harmful.
However, the situation could be dramatically different when alternatives lack full
control on the attention they get (relative salience) and there are harmful spillovers by
rivals. In this case salience may confound the quality ranking, even to the point that
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fully perverse equilibria become possible in which the worst alternative is picked most
often (Claim 2). Moreover, our framework assumes that competition for attention is
directional, in the sense that it is like a shouting competition to get attention in a market.
If you shout louder you always increase the chance that somebodywill notice your stall
- you can never grab more attention by shouting less. When salience is contextual, that
is, alternatives can choose a location in some space of characteristics (e.g., colour) and
they stand out according to how distinct they are from other alternatives, once again
salience may confound the quality ranking, and perverse equilibria may occur (Claim
3).
After presenting attention games (section 2) we discuss issues of existence (section
3). The reader who is mainly interested in the core results can skip at no loss to section
4 where the-showiest-is-the-best results are presented. Section 5 describes contexts in
which perverse equilibria occur. Section 6 discusses the literature.
2 Attention games
Alternatives in a finite set A = fa1, ..., angwish to be chosen by an agent with imperfect
attention. The agent evaluates alternatives by means of a strict preference ordering 
on A. We refer to the position of an alternative in the ranking as its quality, with a lower
i indicating a higher quality, that is ai  aj iff i < j.
Because of imperfect attention, the agent maximises the preference  only on a
consideration set C (A)  A of alternatives (the set of alternatives the agent actively
considers), which is formed stochastically in the manner explained below. When C (A)
is empty, the agent is assumed to pick a default alternative a (e.g. walking away from
the shop, remaining without a partner, abstaining from voting).
The probability that alternative ai belongs to C (A) depends on a set of parameters
σj 2 E, j = 1, ..., n, one for each alternative, where E is an interval of the real line. These
parameters indicate the ability of each alternative to attract attention (and possibly
to dampen or increase the attention paid to the other alternatives). The strategy set
for each ai is a subset S  E. Unless otherwise specified, we need not assume any
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particular structure on S. We call σi 2 S the salience of ai, and a list σ = (σ1, ..., σn) 2 Sn
a salience profile. As usual wewrite σ i to denote the profile σ with the ith entry omitted,
(σ1, ..., σi 1, σi+1, ..., σn), and (σi, σ i) to denote σ. Given two vectors v, v0 2 Rn, we
write v  v0 to signify vi  v0i for all i = 1, ..., n.
The technology of salience is described by functions pi : S
n ! (0, 1), i = 1, .., n.
Each pi associates a salience profile with the probability of membership of C (A) for
ai: that is, pi (σ) is the probability that ai is noticed when the salience profile is σ.
We assume that these probabilities are interior, namely there is always an (arbitrarily
small) positive probability of being noticed or of not being noticed, independently of
salience. The only further assumption we make on the functions pi is the following:
Own Monotonicity: For all i, for all σ 2 Sn: σi > σ0i ) pi (σi, σ i) > pi
 
σ0i, σ i

.
Own Monotonicity stipulates that increasing one’s own salience strictly increases
the probability of being noticed, whatever the salience of the other alternatives. An
example of this type of function, which we will consider later in sections 4 and 6, takes
the ‘Luce form’
pi (σ) =
σi
σ1 + ...+ σn
(1)
with the σis chosen on a strictly positive domain.
3 In this example, an increase in
salience of the other alternatives is harmful to an alternative. While this is natural
in some contexts, our main results do not assume this feature and also allow for the
opposite effect. For instance, an alternative ai which is similar to, or dominated by,
another alternative aj may make the latter more prominent, so that an increase in the
salience of ai is beneficial for the probability of aj getting noticed. These possibilities are
well known and documented in marketing science and psychology as the ‘similarity
effect’ and ‘attraction effect’.
The agent picks the preferred alternative among those that he considers. Therefore,
the probability pii (σ) that alternative ai is chosen at a salience profile σ is the probabil-
ity of the compound event that it is considered and that none of the better alternatives
3We call this the Luce form in view of the Luce [9] stochastic choice rule, popular in econometrics in
the multinomial logit version.
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is considered, that is
pii (σ) = pi (σ)∏
k<i
(1  pk (σ))
The payoff to each alternative is the probability of being chosen minus a (possi-
bly negative) cost associated with the salience level that has been selected. An inter-
pretation of this payoff function is that alternatives vie for one single chooser who
chooses one alternative, with the chosen alternative getting a unit payoff. Another in-
terpretation is that alternatives care about ‘market share’ with a continuum of identical
choosers each of whom chooses one alternative (the latter interpretation is adopted in
Eliaz and Spiegler [5]).
For each i = 1, ..., n, let ei be a function ei : S ! R representing the cost for alter-
native ai of selecting a given level of salience. The payoff to alternative i for a pure
strategy profile σ is
zi (σ) = pii (σ)  ei (σi)
We make no assumption on the functions ei. In particular, ei may be convex or con-
cave or neither, and may not even be monotonic increasing. So ei can represent both
costly effort (for example an advertising budget) and elation, when increasing salience
is pleasurable at least on some range (for example, hairdressing to become salient in
competition for sexual partners).
An attention game is denoted (A, S, z), where z = (z1, z2, ..., zn) with the zi defined
above and satisfying Own Monotonicity.
An attention game has absolute salience if, for all i,
σi = σ
0
i ) pi (σi, σ i) = pi
 
σ0i, σ
0
 i

That is, an attention game with absolute salience is one in which an alternative can
decide its own probability of being noticed independently of the salience choices by the
other alternatives. Of course, even in this case the strategic situation is not trivial: the
payoff of an alternative typically still depends on the salience profile, since it depends
on the probability of being chosen which in turns is determined (for all alternatives
except the best) by the salience profile. As noted before, the situation captured by
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absolute salience fits for example the case of when repeated ads in favour of an alter-
native merely have the function of making the agent actively aware of the alternative
(‘did you know that people who read book A also read book B?’; ‘have you considered
cycling to work’?). The hypothesis of absolute salience does not fit any context akin to
a shouting competition to get attention in a market, in which how much attention you
grab by shouting at a given volume depends on how loud the others shout.
When salience is not absolute it is relative.
We study the Nash equilibria of attention games.
3 Existence
While standard existence results apply formany reasonable specifications of themodel,
in this section we highlight some peculiar features of attention games, which may be
useful in applications. Attention games with absolute salience are - thanks to their
‘hierarchical’ structure - very well behaved in terms of existence properties. A pure
strategy equilibrium is guaranteed in these games for standard strategy sets (like finite
ones) for which in general the extension to mixed strategies or additional assumptions
are needed:
Proposition 1 Let G = (A, S, z) be an attention game with absolute salience. Suppose that S
is finite. Then G has an equilibrium in pure strategies.
And:
Proposition 2 Let G = (A, S, z) be an attention game with absolute salience. Suppose that S
is compact and ei and pi are continuous functions of σi for all i. Then G has an equilibrium in
pure strategies.
Propositions 1 and 2 are particular cases of more general ones. The existence results
below holds for a large class of attention games - including games of absolute salience
- namely those satisfying the following condition
Worse Alternative Independence : For all σ, σ0 2 Sn, for all i: σj = σ0j for all j  i )
pi (σ) = pi (σ
0).
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Worse Alternative Independence says that the probability of being noticed for an
alternative ai depends only on the salience of the alternatives which are better than ai.
Note that this is a weaker requirement than absolute salience. To avoid confusion, we
stress that in any salience game it is true that the probability of being chosen depends
only on the choice probability (hence on the salience) of better alternatives. What is
further asserted by Worse Alternative Independence is that a similar structure holds
for the probability of being noticed of an alternative in relation to the salience of the
other alternatives.
Proposition 3 Let G = (A, S, z) be an attention game such that Worse Alternative Indepen-
dence holds. Suppose that S is finite. Then G has an equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof: Define p11 : S ! (0, 1) by p11 (σ1) = p1 (σ1, σ 1) for all σ 1. The function p11
is well-defined by Worse Alternative Independence. At a pure strategy equilibrium,
alternative a1 simply solves the one-alternative problem
max
σ12S
p11 (σ1)  e1 (σ1)
Given the assumption on S, a solution to this problem exists. Let σ1 denote such a
solution. We construct an equilibrium recursively. For all k  n and σ 2 Sn denote
σk = (σ1, ..., σk) 2 Sk. For i  k let
pki : S
k ! (0, 1)
be given by pki
 
σk

= pi (σ) for all σ 2 Sn (Worse Alternative Independence ensures
that pki is well-defined). Suppose that we have defined the components

σ1 , ..., σ

j 1

of a pure strategy equilibrium for the first j  1 alternatives. Then the jth component
σj is defined by selecting a solution to the problem
max
σj2S
p
j
j

σ1 , ..., σ

j 1, σj

∏
k<j

1  pjk (σk)

  ej
 
σj

(2)
(a solution obviously exists). No alternative aj can profitably deviate at σ
 = (σ1 , ..., σ

n)
thus constructed. In fact, if it were
pj

σ
0
j, σ

 j

∏
k<j
(1  pk (σ))  ej

σ0j

> pj (σ
)∏
k<j
(1  pk (σ))  ej

σj

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for some σ
0
j 2 S, then by the definition of the pki also
p
j
j

σ1 , ..., σ

j 1, σ
0
j

∏
k<j

1  pjk (σk)

  ej

σ0j

> p
j
j

σ1 , ..., σ

j 1, σ

j

∏
k<j

1  pjk (σk)

  ej

σj

so that σj would not solve problem 2, a contradiction.
By an analogous reasoning and standard facts about the existence of maxima of a
function, we also have:
Proposition 4 Let G = (A, S, z) be an attention game such that Worse Alternative Indepen-
dence holds. Suppose that S is compact and that ei and pi are continuous functions of σi for all
i. Then G has an equilibrium in pure strategies.
Compared to standard existence results, note that in the statement of Proposition 4
no convexity assumptions are made - so that Kakutani-type fixed point arguments do
not apply - and that the best reply functions could be non-monotonic - so that Tarsky-
type fixed point theorems do not apply either. Notice also that pi is only required to be
continuous in σi, not necessarily in any σj for j 6= i.
A non-existence example. The following example of a finite game that only has an
equilibrium in mixed strategies shows that Worse Alternative Independence is nec-
essary. There are two alternatives and two levels of salience, high (H) and low (L),
H > L. Let
p1 (L, L) =
1
2
= p1 (L,H)
p1 (H, L) =
2
3
, p1 (H,H) =
3
5
and
p2 (L, L) =
1
3
= p2 (H, L)
p2 (L,H) =
5
12
, p2 (H,H) =
2
3
The effort functions are given by e1 (L) = e2 (L) = 0, e1 (H) = ε and e2 (H) = η.
Worse Alternative Independence fails since p1 (H, L) 6= p1 (H,H). The matrix below,
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in which 1 plays rows and 2 plays columns, summarises the payoffs:
L H
L 12 ,
1
2
1
3
1
2 ,
1
2
5
12   η
H 23   ε, 13 13 35   ε, 25 23   η
It is easy to check that for 110 < ε <
1
6 and
1
24 < η <
7
45 the game has no pure strategy
equilibrium.
4 Does salience reveal quality?
We now come to the core question of the paper. We exhibit environments in which,
when alternatives are ex-ante symmetric except for the difference in quality (they have
access to the same technology of salience), any equilibrium salience order (weakly)
correlates with the quality order. The assumption of technological symmetry ensures
that we are looking at equilibrium effects that only depend on the quality ranking of
the alternatives and the directly resulting incentives, and not on any technological ad-
vantage that better alternatives may possess.
Our main characterisation results below require no restriction on the structure of
the strategy sets S, nor on that of the (common) cost function e.
An attention game is symmetricwhen the following holds:
Symmetry:
(i) For all i, j and all x, y 2 S:
pi
 
σ1, ..., σi 1, x, σi+1, ..., σj 1, y, σj+1, ..., σn

= pj
 
σ1, ..., σi 1, y, σi+1, ..., σj 1, x, σj+1, ..., σn

(ii) For all i: ei = e for some e : S! R.
The first part of Symmetry says that the effectiveness of salience for getting noticed
for a given configuration of the other alternatives’ salience is the same for each alter-
native. More precisely, holding the salience of all alternatives fixed except for ai and aj,
the attention attracted by ai with a level of salience x when aj has salience y is the same
as the attention attracted by aj with salience x when ai has salience y. The second part
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of the condition simply says that achieving any level of salience has the same cost for
any two alternatives.
Once again, for games with absolute salience the analysis is very neat:
Proposition 5 Let G be a symmetric attention game with absolute salience. At any equilib-
rium of G the salience chosen by an alternative is never lower than that chosen by alternatives
of lower quality. That is, let ai  aj and let σ be a pure strategy equilibrium of G. Then,
σi  σj.
Proposition 5 is implied by a more general result, which holds for a class of games
that satisfies the following conditions:
Weak Supermodularity: For all i, all σ i, σ0 i 2 Sn 1 with σ0 i  σ i, and all x, y 2 S
with x > y:
pi
 
x, σ0 i
  pi  y, σ0 i  pi (x, σ i)  pi (y, σ i)
Cross Monotonicity: For all i, all σ i, σ0 i 2 Sn 1 with σ0 i  σ i, pi
 
σi, σ
0
 i
 
pi (σi, σ i).
Weak Supermodularity says that the effectiveness for getting noticed of an increase
in an alternative’s own salience increases with the salience of the other alternatives.
Note that this is a condition on the supermodularity of the function pi only: the whole
payoff function need not be supermodular even when Weak Supermodularity is satis-
fied. We do not defend Weak Supermodularity as a compelling property in all situa-
tions;4 but we note that if salience is absolute then Weak Supermodularity is trivially
satisfied.
4One example of when Weak Supermodularity might apply is the following. Consider political elec-
tions where a candidate’s salience is obtained by means of negative campaigning agaist competitors. It
is conceivable that the effectiveness of increasing one’s own recognition at the expense of little known
rivals would be negligible. However, were these other politicians well known (salient), the effect of the
same electoral campaign/increase in salience might be effective.
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Cross Monotonicity says that an alternative cannot harm the visibility of the rivals
by raising own salience: it can only increase it (for example through a “similarity ef-
fect”) or leave it unchanged (while obviously changing its own visibility), as in games
of absolute salience.
Proposition 6 (The showiest is the best). Let σ be a pure strategy equilibrium of a sym-
metric attention game satisfying Weak Supermodularity and Cross Monotonicity. Then the
salience chosen by an alternative is never lower than that chosen by alternatives of lower qual-
ity. That is, ai  aj ) σi  σj.
Proof: By contradiction, suppose that for some i and j we have ai  aj but σi < σj. We
use a revealed preference argument. Because σi is optimal for alternative ai, it must
provide a weakly higher expected payoff than σj, that is
pi (σi, σ i)∏
k<i
(1  pk (σ))  ei (σi)  pi
 
σj, σ i

∏
k<i
(1  pk (σ))  ei
 
σj

(3)
,  pi (σi, σ i)  pi  σj, σ i∏
k<i
(1  pk (σ))  e (σi)  e
 
σj

using Symmetry (ii) in the second line.
Since σi < σj, by Own Monotonicity we have pi (σi, σ i)  pi
 
σj, σ i

< 0. Since
1  pk (σ) > 0 for all k by the range assumption on the pk, it follows that ∏k<i (1  pk (σ)) >
0. Since i < j, we have that ∏k<i (1  pk (σ)) > ∏k<j (1  pk (σ)). Therefore (3) implies
0 >
 
pi (σi, σ i)  pi
 
σj, σ i

∏
k<j
(1  pk (σ)) > e (σi)  e
 
σj

(4)
To avoid cumbersome notation, denote, for x, y 2 S,
 
y, x, σ ij

=
 
σ1, ..., σi 1, y, σi+1, ...σj 1, x, σj+1.., σn

the profile in which ai plays y, aj plays x and all other alternatives play as in σ. By
Symmetry (i) we have
pi
 
σj, σ i
  pi (σi, σ i) = (5)
pj
 
σj, σj, σ ij
  pj  σj, σi, σ ij
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Moreover, by Weak Supermodularity
pj
 
σj, σj, σ ij
  pj  σj, σi, σ ij (6)
 pj
 
σi, σj, σ ij
  pj  σi, σi, σ ij
= pj
 
σj, σ j
  pj  σi, σ j
Therefore combining (5) and (6) we have
pi
 
σj, σ i
  pi (σi, σ i)  pj  σj, σ j  pj  σi, σ j,
pj
 
σi, σ j
  pj  σj, σ j  pi (σi, σ i)  pi  σj, σ i (7)
Using (7) in (4) yields (recall again that pj
 
σi, σ j
  pj  σj, σ j < 0 byOwnMonotonic-
ity)
0 >
 
pj
 
σi, σ j
  pj  σj, σ j∏
k<j
(1  pk (σ)) > e (σi)  e
 
σj

) pj
 
σi, σ j

∏
k<j
(1  pk (σ))  e (σi) > pj
 
σj, σ j

∏
k<j
(1  pk (σ))  e
 
σj

By Cross Monotonicity we have
pk (σ)  pk
 
σ1, ..., σj 1, σi, σj+1, ..., σn

and thus we conclude that
pj
 
σi, σ j

∏
k<j
 
1  pk
 
σ1, ..., σj 1, σi, σj+1, ..., σn
  e (σi) > pj  σj, σ j∏
k<j
(1  pk (σ))  e
 
σj

But this means that alternative aj would improve by deviating from σj to σi at profile
σ, a contradiction.
Why do the conditions on pi turn out to be important for the result? Let’s think of
the incentives to invest in salience. On the one hand, this investment attracts attention
to oneself by Own Monotonicity. But - depending on the pis - there may also be a
second effect: that of detracting attention from other alternatives. This second part of
the incentive is always stronger for lower quality alternatives. Good alternatives “do
not care” whether worse alternatives are noticed or not - their payoff only depends
on the probability that even better alternatives are noticed. In the extreme case, the
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best alternative only cares about its own probability of getting noticed, so that the only
incentive it has is of the first type. Thus if the pis are decreasing in the salience of other
alternatives, there is a tendency for the investment in salience to be more profitable the
lower the quality of an alternative. Cross Monotonicity removes this tendency. Assume
now that a worse alternative w finds it profitable to raise salience from l to h > l while
a better alternative b chooses l. Can this be an equilibrium? Suppose for simplicity that
b is the only other alternative beside w. Note that b’s gain in visibility when moving
from l to h would be scaled up compared to that of w, by a factor strictly greater than
one, given by the (reciprocal of the) probability that b is not noticed: only if b is not
noticed, in fact, will w be picked if noticed. So the only reason why b might not want
to follow w in raising salience to h is that raising own salience becomes less effective
for becoming more noticeable when the rivals raise their salience, which w has done.
Weak supermodularity eliminates precisely this effect. So if it were profitable for the
worse alternative w to raise salience to h, it would be a fortiori profitable for the better
alternative b, and therefore the initial configuration could not be an equilibrium.
Note that the the-showiest-is-the-best result is unrelated to any kind of signalling
argument. There is no hidden quality to signal to the chooser via costly investment.
The reason why lower quality alternatives never produce more salience in equilibrium
does not derive either from lower levels of resources or lower unit costs of salience
production, both types of asymmetry having been ruled out: every alternative can
choose from exactly the same set at exactly the same cost or benefit. The result is
purely a function of the cognitive process postulated for the chooser.
At least limited forms of the the-showiest-is-the-best property also hold in other
“natural” attention games despite them failing both Weak Supermodularity and Cross
Monotonicity. We illustrate the point with an example, in which the probability of be-
ing noticed takes the Luce form (1) and alternatives can choose any positive level of
salience. Even in the two player case, whether or not the supermodularity condition
pi

x, σ0j

  pi

y, σ0j

 pi
 
x, σj
  pi  y, σj holds depends on the sign of σ0jσj   xy.
Moreover, for any alternative own salience is detrimental for the rivals’ chances of
being noticed. Nevertheless, we show that the the-showiest-is-the-best result fully ap-
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plies in the two-alternative case, or to the two best alternatives in any gamewith n > 2.
Claim 1 Let G = (A, S, z) be a symmetric attention game with S = R++; pi (σ) = σiσ1+...+σn
for all i, all σ; and with e twice differentiable and weakly convex. Then at any equilibrium σ of
G the salience chosen by the best alternative is never lower than that chosen by the second best
alternative; that is, σ1  σ2.
Proof: Denote k = σ3 + ...+ σn  0. At any interior equilibrium the FOCs for alterna-
tives 1 and 2 must be satisfied
∂

σ1
σ1+σ2+k

∂σ1
= e0 (σ1)
∂

σ2
σ1+σ2+k
σ2+k
σ1+σ2+k

∂σ2
= e0 (σ2)
where e0 denotes the first derivative of e. Dividing side by side the two equations and
computing we get
(k+ σ2)
k+ σ1 + σ2
kσ1 + kσ2 + 2σ1σ2 + k2
=
e0 (σ1)
e0 (σ2)
(8)
Suppose by contradiction that σ2 > σ1. Then, by the weak convexity of e,
e0(σ1)
e0(σ2)
 1. It
follows from (8) that
(k+ σ2)
k+ σ1 + σ2
kσ1 + kσ2 + 2σ1σ2 + k2
 1,
σ1  σ2 + k
a contradiction in view of k  0.
The next example shows that Proposition 6 cannot be strengthened to obtain a strict
correlation between salience and quality.
Example 1 (No strict correlation). Assume absolute salience (hence Weak Supermodularity
and Cross Monotonicity) and suppose again that there are two alternatives that choose between
a high (H) and low (L) level of salience. The probability of being noticed is ε < 12 for low
salience, which has zero cost, while it is 1  ε for high salience. Low salience is costless while
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high salience costs η > 0. The matrix below, in which alternative 1 plays rows and alternative
2 plays columns, illustrates.
L H
L ε, (1  ε) ε ε, (1  ε)2   η
H 1  ε  η, ε2 1  ε  η, ε (1  ε)  η
In this attention game there may be two types of equilibria in which salience is only weakly
correlated with quality: (H,H) is an equilibrium if η  ε (1  2ε), while (L, L) is an equi-
librium if η  (1  2ε) (1  ε). In addition to these, (H, L) is also an equilibrium if η 2
[ε (1  2ε) , 1  2ε], while (L,H) is an equilibrium if η  (1  2ε) (1  ε).
The the-showiest-is-the-best property ensures that if there is an alternative that is
uniquely maximally salient in equilibrium, then that alternative must also be the best
one; but it does not exclude that alternatives of differing qualities tie for salience. How-
ever, even if we have to settle for a weak correlation, an important and immediate
implication of Proposition 6 is:
Corollary 1 (The best gets picked most often) Let σ be a pure strategy equilibrium of a
symmetric attention game satisfying Weak Supermodularity and Cross Monotonicity. Then
alternatives of higher quality are chosen with strictly greater probability. That is, ai  aj )
pii (σ) > pi j (σ).
Corollary 1 can be read from a revealed preference perspective. Suppose that nei-
ther the salience of alternatives nor the agent’s preferences are observable to an outside
party, but that this party knows the structure of the game. Then, Corollary 1 implies
that the observer could still perfectly infer - under the assumption of technological
symmetry - the preference ranking of the agent from choice data, simply by checking
the choice frequencies.
A second perspective from which Corollary 1 can be read is as showing circum-
stances in which competitive forces act as a countervailing force to the cognitive limi-
tations of the chooser. Competition pushes the best alternatives to invest sufficiently in
salience to overcome the distorsive effects of imperfect attention on the relative popu-
larity of the alternatives.
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5 When the ugly duckling is the most popular: Relative
and contextual salience
5.1 Relative salience
When salience is relative, and Weak Supermodularity or Cross Monotonicity fail, the
neat equilibrium ordering obtained in Proposition 6may break down. In fact extremely
perverse equilibria become possible, in which the worst alternative is selected with the
highest probability.
Claim 2 There are attention games of relative salience with equilibria in which the worst al-
ternative is chosen with the highest probability.
This claim is shown with a two-alternative example in which S = fL,Hg and the
probability of being noticed has the Luce form. So let
pi (σ) =
σi
σi + σj
for i 6= j. We impose the following restrictions on the admissible values of H and L:
H >
9
32
> L > 0
H + L >
1
2
H 2

3
8
  L  1
8
p
9  32L, 3
8
  L+ 1
8
p
9  32L

Let ei (x) = x for i = 1, 2 and x 2 fH, Lg, so we drop the subscript. Then the profile σ =
(L,H) in which the showiest is the worst is a strict Nash equilibrium for all admissible
values of L and H. Not all admissible profiles of this type have the property that
alternative 2 is picked with higher probability. Such profiles do exist, however (the
calculations are in the Appendix).
5.2 Contextual salience
There is a different way in which the the-showiest-is-the-best property may collapse.
So far we have assumed (through Own Monotonicity) that salience, whether absolute
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or relative, is a ‘directional’ attribute for which ‘themore is always the better’: the more
commercials you produce, the louder you shout, the glitzier your clothes, the more
likely - ceteris paribus - you are to get noticed. In some scenarios, however, alternatives
can only control variables whose values are not intrinsically positive or negative for the
aim of attracting attention; whether they are depends, for each alternative, on what
the other alternatives do. If everybody else dresses in green you will be salient by
dressing in yellow, and viceversa. If all other candidates converge on a given political
message, you will stand out by deviating from that message. We call this scenario one
of contextual salience.
We do not attempt to provide a general model of contextual salience. Rather, we
study a simple stylised class of models that generate the perverse result. Suppose that
σi 2 [0, 1] is now a ‘position’ selected by alternative ai in the unit interval. Whether or
not the probability that ai is noticed is increasing in σi nowdepends on the entire profile
σ: that is, Own Monotonicity may fail. In particular, we assume that an alternative’s
probability of being noticed is conferred by its distance from the ‘average alternative’
(excluding itself):
pi (σ) = αi

vi  
∑j 6=i vj
(n  1)
2
2 [0, 1]
where αi 2 (0, 1) for all i can be seen for instance as a psychological parameter indi-
cating how naturally inclined the chooser is to notice any given alternative. Finally
assume for simplicity a null effort function so that we can take
zi (σ) = pi (σ)∏
k<i
(1  pk (σ))
Claim 3 There exist (for some values n and α1, ..., αn) pure strategy Nash equilibria of the
game above in which the worst alternative is chosen with the highest probability.
The proof consists of fairly tedious calculations and is relegated to an Appendix.
The case of contextual salience we have studied has some superficial similarity with
location games à la Hotelling. In that case too alternatives can gain by moving away
from the nearest neighbour. However, the payoff structure is in fact very different. This
19
results, unlike a location game, in an existence result with three players, as detailed in
the proof of Claim 3.
6 Related literature
Eliaz and Spiegler ([5], Eliaz and Spiegler [6]) study in deep detail strategic aspects
of the competition between firms to make their products enter the consideration sets
of consumers. Firms deploy marketing strategies devoted to attention grabbing. The
choice model at the heart of their work is similar to the one axiomatised in an ab-
stract context by Masatlioglu, Nakajima and Ozbay [11] using revealed preference
techniques. However, In these models choice is deterministic. Stochastic choice in a
consideration set model has been axiomatised in Manzini and Mariotti [10]: from this
perspective, the present work offers a mechanism to endogenise, as equilibrium val-
ues, the salience parameters of our previous work.
Differential attention to alternatives is not necessarily tied to a consideration set
interpretation. One interesting example is the recent work by Echenique, Saito and
Tserenjigmid [4], who study a Luce-type (Luce [9]) model of stochastic choice in which
the perception of alternatives by the decision maker is hierarchical. An alternative can
only be chosen if the alternatives that precede it in a perception priority ranking is
(randomly) not chosen. Given that in our setting the set of alternatives is fixed, it turns
out that our model is also consistent with the Echenique et al. interpretation. More
precisely, in a slightly simplified version of their choice model, the primitives are a
utility function u : A ! R and a perception ordering p.5 The probability that a 2 A
is chosen is
u (a)
∑b2A u (b) + u (a)
0
@ ∏
c2A:cpa

1  u (c)
∑b2A u (b) + u (a)
1A
Defining, for all a 2 A
µ (a, A) =
u (a)
∑b2A u (b) + u (a)
5In the general version the perception ordering is a weak order, rather than a strict order, thus allow-
ing for “perception ties".
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this choice model falls within the class of choice models we are considering. To see
this, set =pand set σi = u (ai), so that pi (σ) = µ (ai, A). In this interpretation, we
assume that alternatives cannot change the perception ranking, just as in the consider-
ation set interpretation we assumed that they cannot change the quality ranking. How-
ever, they can compete by striving to raise their quality (utility) and thus increase the
probability of being selected in the event that no alternative that is higher ranked in the
perception ordering is itself selected. Observe that µ (ai, A) is increasing in the utility of
ai and decreasing in the utility of the other alternatives, so that Own Monotonicity for
an attention game is satisfied. The model is not one of absolute salience, and not even
one satisfying Worse Alternative Independence, since pi (σ) depends on the utility of
all other alternatives including inferior ones. Moreover it fails Weak Supermodularity.
However, as shown by Claim 1 in the two alternative version the the-showiest-is-the-
best feature holds under mild assumptions on the cost function. Finally, note that as
Echenique et al. observe, their model has in general (i.e. with a variable A) very differ-
ent observable implications from that of Manzini and Mariotti [10].
7 Concluding remarks
Wrapping up, in this paper we have highlighted several features of mechanisms for
attracting attention. These features can have profoundly different effects on the equi-
librium outcomes of a competition to be chosen by a chooser with imperfect attention.
We have endeavoured to study these effects abstracting as much as possible from the
specific context in which competition takes place. In one mechanism, attracting more
attention is a directional phenomenon, a matter of increasing a quantity (advertising,
shouting, expenditure on hairdressing): the more, the better. Such increases may or
may not have spillovers on the attention grabbed by rivals. And such spillovers when
they exist may or may not be benign, that is, increasing own salience may (i) increase
or decrease the attention devoted to others, and (ii) it may increase or decrease the
gains others derive from raising their own salience. Under quite general conditions it
is only the situation with non-benign spillovers (in either of the two senses (i) and (ii))
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in which it may happen that the worst alternatives grab the most attention and are the
most chosen. Otherwise, equilibrium forces push better alternatives to invest weakly
more in salience; observed frequencies of choice fully reveal any hidden quality or-
dering to an external observer; and strategic competition replaces an agent’s cognitive
ability. Yet another kind of mechanism operates when salience is non-directional, that
is when grabbing attention is a matter of positioning oneself appropriately in a space
of characteristics vis a vis the competitors. In this case again salience may confound
quality; the choices of cognitively limited choosers may be completely unrevealing of
preferences; and competitive forces are no substitute for individual cognitive power.
In the present work we have considered quality a fixed characteristic of the alter-
natives. In future research, we plan to study the situation in which both salience and
quality are a variable of choice.
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8 Appendix: Calculation for Claim 2
For (L,H) to be an equilibrium we need
z1 (L,H) =
L
L+ H
  e (L) > H
2H
  e (H) = z1 (H,H)
z2 (L,H) =
H
L+ H

1  L
L+ H

  e (H) > L
2L

1  L
2L

  e (L) = z2 (L, L)
that is
e (H)  e (L) > 1
2
  L
L+ H
e (H)  e (L) <

H
L+ H
2
  1
4
With our choice of cost function the equilibrium condition for alternative 1 becomes
e (H)  e (L) = H   L > 1
2
  L
L+ H
,
(H   L) (2H + 2L  1) > 0
holds given our restrictions on H and L. Turning to the equilibrium condition for 2:
e (H)  e (L) = H   L <

H
L+ H
2
  1
4
,
1
4
(H   L)
 
8HL+ 4H2 + 4L2   3H   L
(H + L)2
< 0
The inequality is verified since the quadratic at the numerator has roots H1,2 =
3
8   L
1
8
p
9  32L in view of our restrictions on L and H.
So far we have shown that the worse alternative has strictly higher salience than
the better alternative in all admissible profiles (L,H). But not all admissible profiles
have the property that alternative 2 is picked with higher probability than alternative
1. Such profiles do exist, however. For example, let H = 25and L =
4
25 (it is easy to
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check that this profile is admissible), so that
pi2 (L,H) =
2
5
2
5 +
4
25
 
1 
4
25
2
5 +
4
25
!
=
25
49
>
2
7
=
4
25
2
5 +
4
25
= pi1 (L,H)
9 Appendix: Proof of Claim 3
We consider the case of three alternatives and show that the position profile σ =
(0, 0, 1) is a Nash Equilibrium with the desired property. For a generic profile σ =
(σ1, σ2, σ3), the choice probabilities are given by
z1 (σ) =
 
σ1   σ2+σ32
2
α1
z2 (σ) =

σ2   σ1+σ32
2
α2

1   σ1   σ2+σ32 2 α1
z3 (σ) =

σ3   σ1+σ22
2
α3

1   σ1   σ2+σ32 2 α11  σ2   σ1+σ32 2 α2
so that
z1 (0, 0, 1) =
1
4α1
z2 (0, 0, 1) =
1
4α2

1  14α1

z3 (0, 0, 1) = α3

1  14α1
 
1  14α2

and thus
z3 (σ
) > z2 (σ) > z1 (σ) (9)
for suitable values of αi, e.g. provided that α3 > min
n
α2
4 α2 ,
4α1
(4 α1)(4 α2)
o
2 (0, 1).
To check that the above is an equilibrium, observe that first derivatives of the payoff
functions with respect to own salience are:
∂(z1(σ))
∂σ1
= (2σ1   (σ2 + σ3)) α1
∂(z2(σ))
∂σ2
= (2σ2   (σ1 + σ3)) α2

1   σ1   σ2+σ32 2 α1+ α1α2 σ2   σ1+σ32 2  σ1   σ2+σ32 
∂(z3(σ))
∂σ3
= α3 (2σ3   (σ1 + σ2))

1   σ1   σ2+σ32 2 α11  σ2   σ1+σ32 2 α2
+α1α3

σ3   σ1+σ22
2  
σ1   σ2+σ32
 
1 

σ2   σ1+σ32
2
α2

+α2α3

σ3   σ1+σ22
2 
1   σ1   σ2+σ32 2 α1 σ2   σ1+σ32 
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It is seen immediately that, with σ2+σ32 2 [0, 1] being a minimum for z1 (σ), alternative
1’s best reply is a corner solution, i.e. either σ1 = 1 (if
σ2+σ3
2  12 ) or σ1 = 0 (if
σ2+σ3
2  12 ). Turning now to alternative 2, we see that
∂ (z2 (σ))
∂σ2
σ1=0
σ3=1
=
1
8
α2 (2σ2   1)

8  4α1σ22   α1   5α1σ2

with three roots,6
r1 =
1
2
r2 =
1
8α1

 5α1 +
q
128α1 + 9α
2
1

 r1
r3 =   1
8α1

5α1 +
q
128α1 + 9α
2
1

< 0
There are two candidate best replies at σ2 = 0 and σ2 = min f1, r2g. Letting α1 2
0, 45

ensures that σ2 = r2 is not a best reply.
7 The choice probabilities corresponding
to the two remaining candidate best replies are:
z2 (0, 0, 1) =
1
4
α2

1  1
4
α1

z2 (0, 1, 1) =
1
4
α2 (1  α1) < 1
4
α2

1  1
4
α1

so that, regardless of the size of α1 and α2, alternative 2 cannot profitably deviate from
σ.
Finally consider alternative 3:
∂z3 (σ)
∂σ3
σ1=0
σ2=0
=
1
8
α3σ3

 8α1σ23   8α2σ23 + 3α1α2σ43 + 16

Of the three distinct roots of the polynomial,8 one is negative, one is larger than unity
and one is σ3 = 0, with
∂z3(σ)
∂σ3
σ1=0
σ2=0
> 0 for σ3 2 (0, 1). It follows that z3 (0, 0, σ3) is
6To check the inequality in the second line below observe that
1
8α1

 5α1 +
q
128α1 + 9α
2
1

 12 ,
128
α172
 1
which holds true always.
7Observe that r2 > 1 if and only if α1 2

0, 45

.
8The roots are 0 and 1.154 7
r
1
α1α2

α1 + α2  
q
α21   α1α2 + α22

, where the non zero roots are dou-
ble roots.
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maximised for σ3 = 1, with corresponding choice probability
z3 (σ
) = α3

1  1
4
α1

1  1
4
α2

> 0 = z3 (0, 0, 0)
Then σ = (0, 0, 1) is a Nash equilibrium in which, provided that α1 2

0, 45

and
α3 > min
n
α2
4 α2 ,
4α1
(4 α1)(4 α2)
o
, condition (9) holds, so that the worst alternative has the
highest probability of being chosen
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